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Are the practices of Canada's Foreign Investment Review
Agency," which regulates foreign investment, contrary to Canada's
obligations to the United States under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade?2 As a leading recipient of investment capital
from the United States and as a major trading partner of the
United States, Canada has always maintained a friendly, if some-
what defensive, economic relationship with the United States. The
two countries have a history of amicable trading. Only rarely in the
past has a trade dispute between Canada and the United States
entered the international arena.' Recently, Canada's commitment
to welcoming only that foreign investment which could bring sig-
nificant benefit to Canada has led to a new international trade dis-
pute between the United States and Canada." The issue in this dis-
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Windsor. LL.B., Makerere University (1971);
LL.M., Harvard University (1974); S.J.D., Harvard University (1979). The author wishes to
express her appreciation to Pamela Hillen, a third year law student at the University of
Windsor, for her research assistance.
The Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) was created under the Foreign Invest-
ment Review Act (the Act), 1973-1974 CAN. Rzv. STAT. ch. 46.
' General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
11, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1950) [hereinafter cited as GATTI.
3 See, e.g., Canadian Import Quota on Eggs, GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Doc-
uments (BISD) 91, 92, appendix, case 78 (23rd Supp. 1977); Exports of Potatoes to Canada,
GATT, BISD 88, 89 (11th Supp. 1963).
" Neither the FIRA nor United States officials has been willing to divulge the exact con-
tent of the United States complaint. The following two excerpts are, however, helpful:
What we are challenging are commitments extracted by FIRA from compa-
nies seeking to invest in Canada that legally bind those companies to source
locally or to export.
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pute is whether Canada, in its attempt to encourage beneficial
foreign direct investment, has acted contrary to its obligations to
the United States and to the international community.
The United States contention that some of the side effects of
Canada's regulation of its foreign direct investment have led to a
violation of free trade principles may have serious implications for
the political and economic relationship between the two countries.
This Article will present the possible areas of conflict, analyze the
United States allegations, and discuss a possible outcome of the
dispute as well as possible future approaches to the issues.
II. BACKGROUND TO THE FIRA/GATT CONFLICT
A. Foreign Investment in Canada and FIRA
Canada's history, its vast natural resources, and its relatively
small population have led Canadians to need and to encourage
capital inflow as a means of developing the country's economy.'
The level of foreign direct investment increased dramatically after
World War II. By 1970, 36 % of all assets in non-financial corpora-
tions in Canada were controlled by foreigners, including 69% in
the mining sector and 58% in the manufacturing sector.7 The
United States controlled over 75% of all foreign investment in Ca-
Letter from Nicholas Burakow, United States Department of Commerce, to Dr. Emily
Carasco (March 3, 1983) (discussing the United States complaint against FIRA).
As you may be aware, our complaint addresses certain trade-related aspects of
FIRA's operations, not FIRA itself. Specifically, we are maintaining that the
practice by which FIRA exacts undertakings from prospective foreign inves-
tors to source locally and/or to export certain percentages or volumes of pro-
duction is contrary to certain GATT principles.
Letter from W.S. Merkin, Office of the United States Trade Representative, to Dr. Emily
Carasco (February 24, 1983) (discussing the United States complaint against FIRA).
6 Canada has had a long history of encouraging the flow of capital into the country. Sir
John A. MacDonald's National Party was directed to encourage capital inflow. High tariffs
have also provided a strong motive for direct investment, especially by United States inves-
tors. the United States is Canada's major supplier of external capital. See generally G.
HUGHES, A COMMENTARY ON THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT ACT (1975); TASK FORCE ON THE
STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY, PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE; FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND THE
STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY (1968); J. YOUNG, CANADIAN COMMERCIAL POLICY, ROYAL
COMMSSION ON CANADA'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS (1975).
1 Between 1945 and 1967 the book value of United States long term investment in Ca-
nada increased from just under $5 billion to $28 billion (about 81% of total foreign invest-
ment), while direct investments increased from around $2 billion to $17 billion. GovER-
MENT OF CANADA, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CANADA 13-14 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
The Gray Report].
I Statistics Canada, Corporation and Labour Returns Act, Annual Report, 1970, Cat. No.
61-210 at 12, (March 1973).
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nada.5 A study commissioned by the Canadian government in 1972
concluded that although foreign direct investment had been neces-
sary for economic development, it had side effects which were not
always to Canada's long term benefit. 9 The study, known as the
Gray Report, led to the passage of the Foreign Investment Review
Act in 1974. The Act created the Foreign Investment Review
Agency."0
FIRA was intended as an instrument not for restricting foreign
investment but for reviewing potential foreign direct investment
with the intention of approving all foreign direct investment likely
to be of "significant benefit to Canada."1" The Act regulates for-
eign investments in the Canadian economy by subjecting to federal
government review the acquisition of control of existing Canadian
business enterprises by a foreign individual, government or corpo-
ration (referred to as "non-eligible persons") and the establish-
ment of new business enterprises in Canada by non-eligible per-
sons, including investments by existing foreign-owned Canadian
businesses in new areas of business.12 Non-eligible persons seeking
to enter either of these two categories of investment in Canada
must apply to the FIRA for approval of the proposed investment.
Approval of an acquisition of control or establishment of new busi-
ness will be given by the federal Cabinet if the applicant demon-
strates that the acquisition or establishment will be of "significant
benefit to Canada" under criteria listed in the Act. Included in this
list of criteria is the "effect on the level and nature of economic
activity in Canada, including employment, resource processing,
utilization of parts, components and services produced in Canada,
and exports from Canada."' 8 To satisfy this criterion foreign inves-
8 Dewhirst, The Foreign Investment Review Act, in INTERNATIONAL BusiN SS: A CANADIAN
PERSPECTIVE 451 (K. Dhawan ed. 1980).
9 See The Gray Report, supra note 6, at 430.
10 See supra note 1.
" The Act, 1973-1974 CAN. REv. STAT. ch. 46, § 2(1).
12 Id. §§ 3-4.
" Id. § 2(2):
(a) the effect of the acquisition or establishment on the level and nature of
economic activity in Canada, including, without limiting the generality of
the foregoing, the effect on employment, on resource processing, on the
utilization of parts, components and services produced in Canada, and on
exports from Canada;
(b) the degree and significance of participation by Canadians in the business
and in any industry or industries in Canada of which the business enter-
prise or new business forms or would form a part;
(c) the effect of the acquisition or establishment on productivity, industrial
1983] 443
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tors sometimes undertake to carry out trade-related performance
requirements. Examples frequently cited include undertakings by
foreign companies to purchase parts and materials in Canada, to
export a portion of their production, and to establish an exclusive
distribution network for their products within the country.
In 1982, FIRA approved 86% of the applications it received."
Despite FIRA approval of the vast majority of applications by po-
tential foreign investors, successive United States administrations
have complained about FIRA's procedures. 8 The criticism was
particularly harsh when in 1981 Canada outlined nationalist energy
policies that the United States believed openly discriminated
against United States dominated multinational oil operations in
Canada.16 One allegation against Canada was heard above the rest:
FIRA's procedures were claimed to be in violation of Canada's ob-
ligations under the GATT.17
B. The GATT Connection
The GATT, which is the most important international agree-
ment regulating trade among most of the market economy indus-
trialized nations, has an overall goal of reducing nationalist prac-
tices that inhibit free trade. The 1947 General Agreement, to
efficiency, technological development, product innovation and product va-
riety in Canada;
(d) the effect of the acquisition or establishment on competition within any
industry or industries in Canada; and
(e) the compatibility of the acquisition or establishment with national indus-
trial and economic policies, taking into consideration industrial and eco-
nomic policy objectives enunciated by the government or legislature of any
province likely to be significantly affected by the acquisition or
establishment.
1 The Globe and Mail, Nov. 20, 1982, at 314.
"See supra note 4. The United States has not been alone in its criticism of FIRA. For a
different perspective, see Twaalfhoven, Foreign Investment Review Act: Comments by a
Concerned Dutch Party, in INTEMNATIONAL Busmss: A CANADIAN PER cTIVE 466 (K.
Dhawan ed. 1980).
"* Canada's National Energy Program (NEP) has set an objective of 50% Canadian own-
ership of the oil and gas industries in Canada by 1990. The United States has objected
strongly to this goal as discriminatory. United States companies currently own approxi-
mately 66% of Canada's gas and oil industries. See MacDonald, Canadian Industrial Policy
Objectives and Article III of GATT: National Ambitions and International Obligations, 6
CAN. Bus. L.J. 385, 388-91 (1982); Issues in United States-Canadian Economic Relations:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Economic Policy and Trade and the Subcomm. on
Inter-American Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 8
(1981) (statement of R.S. Waldmann, Assistant Secretary for International Economic Policy,
U.S. Department of Commerce).
" See, e.g., infra note 24 and accompanying text.
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which both the United States and Canada are contracting parties,
embodies the results of tariff negotiations and contains general
protective articles which seek to prevent evasion of tariff commit-
ments."' These articles, now numbering thirty-eight, contain de-
tailed rules and obligations designed generally to prevent nations
from pursuing "beggar-thy-neighbour" trade policies1' which
would be self-defeating if emulated by other nations. Recognizing
the role that international economic affairs had played in causing
World War II, GATT contracting parties concentrated on lowering
post World War II tariff levels in the belief that this would prevent
a repetition of pre-World War II economic instability. In recent
years, starting with the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Nego-
tiations, increasing attention has been focused on non-tariff barri-
ers that distort trade.2s
Some trade-related performance requirements may arguably be
regarded as non-tariff barriers because they result in a direct
transfer of investment, jobs, and production to the country which
imposes them - and away from other countries. An argument has
been made that the international shifts in investment, employ-
ment, production, and trade which are caused by trade-related per-
formance requirements are not a response to market forces, but are
imposed by government fiat. 1 Although their purpose is to in-
crease the economic welfare of the country imposing such mea-
sures, these requirements may be regarded as a new form of "beg-
gar-thy-neighour" policy. However, trade-related performance
requirements were not discussed at the Tokyo Round, and there
are currently no international norms regarding their legitimacy.
One United States company whose undertakings to FIRA have
received considerable attention is Apple Computer, Inc."2 After
nearly a year of talks with FIRA, the company was given permis-
"' For the history and operation of GAIT, see generally, K. DAM, THE GATT LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATON (1970); J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND TE LAW OF
GATT (1969); R. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (1975).
" See generally J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 437
(1977).
'0 At the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, agreement was reached on a
number of matters including trade-distorting government subsidies and countervailing du-
ties imposed to offset the effects of such subsidies. Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round, 9
GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 153 (1979).
" Performance Requirements: A Study of the Incidence and Impact of Trade Related
Performance Requirements and an Analysis of International Law, 1981 Lab.-Indust. Coali-
tion for International Trade viii (March 1981) [hereinafter cited as LICIT].
" FIRA, Release No. F-180 (Sept. 27, 1981).
19831
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sion to set up Canadian operations. Among the many undertakings
given by the company were agreements to purchase Canadian-
made parts, to ensure a certain level of Canadian value-added, and
to recommend Canadian-made peripheral equipment to its dealers
around the world. 3 Apple Computer, Inc.'s application led to the
question of whether undertakings exacted under pressure (and
with the prospect of review three to five years after a major invest-
ment has been made) to achieve percentage levels in repair, main-
tenance, and Canadian value-added or to use specific videotex sys-
tem are not, in effect, more demanding than higher tariff levels or
as demanding as quantitative restrictions, both of which are pro-
scribed by the GATT.24
The trade-related performance requirements which the United
States alleges have been imposed by FIRA may be illustrated by
the following examples:
Company H was required to promise only to bank with Cana-
dian banks and utilize exclusively Canadian advertising agencies
and public accountants.
Company I was required to affirm that it would purchase a spe-
cific percentage of its requirements in Canada.
Company J was requested to reduce its equity share not only in
the firm being acquired in Canada but in other unrelated opera-
tions in Canada.
Company K was required to pledge that it would cease to im-
port specified products.
Company L was pressured to move certain manufacturing oper-
ations from the United States to Canada.
Company M was required to agree to export specific products.
Company N, and numerous others, were required to furnish
technology, trademarks etc. free of charge to its Canadian
subsidiary.
Company 0 was requested to make "financial contributions" to
a Canadian project in which it had no interest.2 '
Based on the imposition by FIRA of such trade-related perform-
ance requirements which are non-tariff barriers to international
trade and which therefore impede the attainment of GATT objec-
23 Id.
MacDonald, supra note 16, at 396.
" Letter from Malcom Badridge, United States Secretary of Commerce, to Herb Gray,




tives and violate explicit GATT provisions,'2 the United States for-
mally requested in March 1982 that the Council of the GATT cre-
ate a panel to examine FIRA and rule on whether Canada is in
violation of its obligations under the GATT . 7 The United States
decision to take its grievances to the GATT Council followed two
months of inconclusive consultations with Canada conducted
under article XXII of the GATT.'
In the event that a dispute between governments such as the
FIRA-Canada/GATT-United States dispute cannot be resolved by
the consultative procedures of article XXII, the GATT provides a
procedure for third party adjudication of legal claims which is
known as the "panel procedure." Article XXII provides that if any
contracting party believes that any benefit accruing to it under the
GATT is being "nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any
objective of the agreement is being impeded" by the actions or
inactions of other contracting parties or by "the existence of any
other situation," the aggrieved contracting party may make written
representations or proposals to the other contracting party or par-
ties which it considers to be concerned.? If no satisfactory adjust-
ment is made, the matter may be referred to the contracting par-
ties who may then set up an investigative panel. The panel usually
consists of three or five respected diplomats from the GATT dele-
gation of countries not involved in the dispute. This panel reports
to the contracting parties or the GATT Council, which makes the
final decision. 0
The outcome of the United States claim that FIRA's trade-re-
lated requirements as part of its foreign investment regulation vio-
late GATT principles will be of significance to more than the two
countries immediately involved in the dispute. Nearly all of the
major trading partners of the United States impose some form of
performance requirements on at least some local affiliates of for-
eign corporations.8 1 Performance requirements relating to the level
of exports are imposed in varying degrees of severity on foreign
e See infra notes 36, 37, 61, and 70 and accompanying text.
" The Globe and Mail, Apr. 1, 1982, at Bi.
"Article XXII provides generally for consultation either between disputing contracting
parties or between the contracting parties and one or more disputing contracting parties as
a preliminary step in dispute resolution. GAT'T, supra note 2, art. XXII.
- Id. art. XXIII(1), (2).
" See J. JACKSON, supra note 18, at 176.
$1 LICIT, supra note 21, at 4.
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investments in at least seventeen countries.3 2 For example, Brazil-
ian regulations differentiate between automobile manufacturers
with a Brazilian approved export program and those without such
a program. Companies with an export program are favoured and
allowed a lower level of local content by value. 3 Israel offers incen-
tives linked to 20% to 50% production for export and some of its
grants and loans are tied to export performance.
Although perhaps the most assertive advocate of foreign invest-
ment review, Canada is not alone among the economically devel-
oped nations in its campaign to review foreign direct investment."
Australia, France, Japan, and even the United States are among
the group of economically advanced nations that monitors or in
some way restricts foreign direct investment.3 6 There is no custom-
ary international law prohibiting such restriction or monitoring
since investment is considered an internal matter.3 7 Hence, the
United States claim against FIRA is directed not at the existence
of FIRA, unhappy as the United States may be about its presence,
but at the FIRA practice of obtaining trade-related performance
undertakings which are allegedly contrary to Canada's GATT
obligations."
III. THE FIRA/GATT COMPLAINT
The types of trade-related performance requirements which the
United States alleges that FIRA imposes may be challenged as be-
ing proscribed by a number of GATT provisions, specifically, those
n' These countries are Belguim, Brazil, Canada, Greece, India, Israel, Italy, Korea, Malay-
sia, Mexico, New Zealand, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Taiwan, and Turkey. See
id. Table 3, at 7.
" Id. at 8.
" Id. (b) at 4.
Foreign investment regulation is usually associated with the less developed nations.
Brazil, Mexico, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Algeria, Nigeria and Peru, which are major
recipients of foreign investment among the less developed countries, have some form of in-
vestment regulations. See id. at 16.
" In recent years, a number of developed countries have enacted some form of foreign
investment regulation. See generally Note, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States:
Possible Restrictions at Home and a New Climate for American Investment Abroad, 26
AM. U.L. REv. 109 (1976).
87 Control of foreign direct investment is an aspect of economic development and there-
fore within the domestic jurisdiction of a nation. See Declaration on Principles of Interna-
tional Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, Oct. 24, 1970, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
" See supra note 4.
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governing national treatment, elimination of quantitative restric-
tions, and subsidies. Further, in cases where a performance re-
quirement restricts trade in an item covered by a tariff concession,
it may be considered an impairment of that concession.89
A. GATT Article III: National Treatment
Article III of the GATT, entitled "National Treatment on Inter-
nal Taxation and Regulation," seeks to ensure that imported pro-
ducts are treated no less favourably than domestic products.40 Like
the most-favoured-nation rule, another keystone GATT rule, na-
tional treatment is a rule of non-discrimination. It means that im-
ported goods should be accorded the same treatment as goods of
local origin with respect to matters under government control, such
as taxation and regulation." Paragraph 1 of this article provides
that domestic production is not to receive protection with respect
to taxation." The article further elaborates the principle of na-
tional treatment as it applies to particular areas: internal taxes and
charges, internal laws or requirements, quantitative restrictions,
and price controls."
A number of the official disputes that have arisen through the
dispute settlement procedure in the GATT has dealt with the na-
tional treatment clause of the GATT." These disputes usually in-
volve tax, particularly border tax adjustments in relation to the
first sentence of article III(1). The tax provisions may not be rele-
vant to the FIRA/GATT dispute, but the prohibition of quantita-
tive regulation "so as to afford protection to domestic production"
may be highly relevant. It may be argued that value-added re-
quirements, by definition, involve quantitative regulation of for-
' For instance, a performance requirement may relate to one or more of the sectors cov-
ered by tariff concessions made by Canada to the United States. For examples of Canada's
tariff concessions, see General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Protocol, Volume I, Geneva
(June 30, 1979).
GATT, supra note 2, art. M.
" J. JACKSON, supra note 18, at 273.
" Paragraph 1 sets out the basic principle in broad terms:
The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal
changes, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale,
offering for sale, or purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products,
and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use
of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to im-
ported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production.
GATT, supra note 2, art. HI.
43 Id.
" J. JACKSON, supra note 18, at 284-86 nn.21-27.
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eign investment operations within the country with the goal of fa-
cilitating and protecting domestic production. 5 Value-added
requirements force an enterprise to use local materials or compo-
nents even if it would have otherwise preferred to import such
materials or components. In effect, a quantitative regulation is im-
posed on certain items.
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of article III, which are relevant to the issue
of local sourcing, allow for further arguments alleging FIRA/GATT
incompatibility. 46 Paragraph 4 deals with national treatment for
imported products with respect to all laws, regulations, and re-
quirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution, or use. Paragraph 5 prohibits the es-
tablishment of any regulations relating to the mixture, processing,
or use of products in specified amount or proportion which re-
quires that any specified amount or proportion of any product be
supplied from domestic sources. Undertakings made to FIRA by
the United States companies, such as Apple Computers, Inc.'s un-
dertaking to ensure 30% Canadian value-added of the cost goods
sold in Canada, arguably may be treatment that is contrary to the
national treatment requirement of paragraph 4. Apple Computer,
Inc.'s undertaking to purchase Canadian-made parts arguably may
be a local sourcing requirement imposed by the Canadian Govern-
ment. As such, it would be contrary to paragraphs 4 and 5 of arti-
cle III.
The Canadian Government and FIRA officials repeatedly have
pointed out that value-added undertakings or local sourcing under-
takings such as those given by Apple Computer, Inc. and by other
48 LICIT, supra note 21, at 20.
GATT, supra note 2, art. III, § 2:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the terri-
tory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less fa-
vourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of
all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for
sale, purchases, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this par-
agraph shall not prevent the application of differential transportation charges
which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of trans-
port and not on the nationality of the product. Section 5 provides that no
contracting party shall establish or maintain any internal quantitative regula-
tion relating to the mixture, processing or use of products in specified
amounts or proportions which requires, directly or indirectly, that any speci-
fied amount or proportion of any product which is the subject of the regula-
tion be supplied from domestic sources. Moreover, no contracting party shall
otherwise apply internal quantitative regulations in a manner contrary to the
principles set forth in paragraph 1.
[Vol. 13:441
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applicants to FIRA are undertakings freely entered into and not
requirements imposed by FIRA.'7 There is nothing in the Act that
requires applicants to make any undertakings in order to obtain
approval for the proposed foreign investment. Nevertheless, some
undertakings are almost always made, and FIRA has admitted that
undertakings make assessment of an application easier.41 Under-
takings once made are binding on the applicant if the investment
is allowed, and there are provisions in the Act whereby in case of
non-compliance, the Minister may apply to the courts for remedial
orders.49 Although no legal action has yet been taken on any un-
dertakings made by successful applicants, the potential for legal
action does exist. The Minister in charge of FIRA has stated that
renegotiation is a preferred alternative. 50 The effect of these "un-
dertakings," however, at least as far as the foreign investor is con-
cerned, is the same as that of a requirement, i.e. the investor is
legally bound by the undertaking.
FIRA and the Canadian government could question whether the
drafters of the GATT intended article III to apply to FIRA-type
regulations which are foreign investment regulations and not trade
restrictive regulations. The goal of FIRA regulations was the pro-
motion of beneficial foreign investment to develop and strengthen
the Canadian economy. At least one attempt has already been
made to confine article 111(4) interpretation to trade regulations. In
a 1958 dispute between Italy and the United Kingdom, the latter
alleged that an Italian law which provided special credit facilities
to the purchasers of agricultural machinery was inconsistent with
Italy's article 111(4) obligation to provide national treatment to im-
ports.51 Italy argued that the GATT was a trade agreement and
that its scope was limited to measures governing trade. Moreover,
the Italian delegation considered that the text of article 111(4)
could not be construed in such a way as to prevent the Italian gov-
ernment from taking the necessary measures to assist economic de-
41 See, e.g., FIRA, Release No. F-174 (Aug. 4, 1981) at 2-3; How FIRA Works, 6 FOREIGN
INvESTMENT REV. No. 1 (1982) at 7, 8.
4 How FIRA Works, supra note 47, at 8.
4 Dewhirst, supra note 8, at 459.
" See e.g., Grover, Foreign Investment Review in Canada, in NEw DEVELOPMENTS IN
FOREIGN TRADE AND INvESTMENT. AusTRALuA, UNITED STATES, CANADA 42 (Presented jointly
by the International Law Institute of Georgetown University, the Law Institute of the Pa-
cific Rim, and the Law Institute of Australia and North America, August 12, 1982).
" United Kingdom Complaint on Italian Discrimination against Imported Agricultural
Machinery, GATT Report by the Panel for Consultation (July 15, 1958) GATT, BISD 60
(7th Supp. 1959).
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velopment in Italy. In the view of the Italian delegation, it would
be inappropriate for the contracting parties to construe the provi-
sions of article III in a broad way since this would limit their rights
to formulate their domestic policies in a manner which was not
contemplated when they accepted the terms of the GATT. The
GATT panel, however, rejected a narrow view of article 111(4) by
stating that in their opinion:
the drafters of the Article intended to cover in paragraph 4
not only the laws and regulations which directly governed the
conditions of sale or purchase but also any law or regulations
which might adversely modify the conditions of competition
between the domestic and imported products on the internal
market5' (emphasis added).
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether practices such as un-
dertakings which are only related to foreign investment regulations
and are not directly connected with trade will be deemed contrary
to article III. After all, the same panel that rejected a very restric-
tive interpretation of article 111(4) said that the intent of the arti-
cle III drafters "was to provide equal conditions of competition
once goods had been cleared through customs."58 Neither the local
sourcing undertakings nor value-added undertakings affect goods
that have already been imported into Canada.
Article 111(5), which deals with local sourcing, was the subject of
considerable discussion by the GATT drafters. According to one
authority on the GATT, "[m]ixing (local content) requirements re-
ceived extensive consideration by the draftsmen. For example, a
requirement might be imposed that margarine contain at least
20% domestically produced margarine or butter. This would vio-
late the GATT obligation."" However, even at the time article
111(5) was drafted, many countries felt that mixing regulations
should be permissible because, even if they did inhibit trade to
some degree, they were the only effective means of protecting in-
fant industries.55 FIRA's acceptance of an undertaking by Apple
Computer, Inc. to purchase Canadian material was an attempt to
create a competitive market for Canadian goods and to move away
from the tendency of foreign enterprises to favour their own sup-
pliers over domestic goods. Given Canada's desire to build upon its
" Id. at 64.
'Id.
J. JACKSON, supra note 18, at 289.
U.N. Doc. EPCT/c.II/40 (1946); EPCT/A/PV 9, at 52 (1947).
[Vol. 13:441
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secondary manufacturing sector, the Apple Computer, Inc. type of
undertaking does not seem unreasonable. Further, it can be argued
that article I(5) only prohibits regulations on products by the
contracting parties. This article does not affect discrimination
freely undertaken by private firms."
The complainant in the FIRA/GATT dispute, the United States,
is familiar with local sourcing regulations as well as with other leg-
islation regulating foreign investment. 7 "Buy-American" legisla-
tion exists at both federal and state levels in the United States."
"Buy-American" policies range from outright prohibitions on for-
eign purchases by governmental agencies and from embargoes on
communist goods to discriminatory licensing, labelling, and inspec-
tion requirements. These policies may be embodied in state consti-
tutions, statutes, city ordinances, or informal purchasing policies."0
The relationship of local protection to United States international
commitments has given rise to considerable litigation in the United
States.s° One California court has found that, on its face, the Cali-
fornia "buy-American" and "buy-Californian" statutes are in con-
flict with the GATT since foreign products are not being accorded
the national treatment required by article 111(4) of the GATT."1
Canada will undoubtedly bring to the attention of the GATT panel
that the United States is not without its own share of protectionist
legislation. The California "buy-American" act, enacted almost si-
multaneously with the federal "buy-American" law, was a depres-
sion measure designed to ensure that "American tax money should
sustain American Labor in a moment of American crisis and Amer-
ican emergency. ' '1s Canada's motivation in creating FIRA was not
significantly different.
The federal Buy-American Act s does provide an example of how
W J. JACKSON, supra note 18, at 289-90.
57 See generally U.S. Too Has Foreign Investment Restrictions, The Ottawa Citizen,
Feb. 20, 1982, at 9.
See Buy-American Act, 47 Stat. 1520 (1933), 41 U.S.C. §§ 10(a)-(d) (1958). For exam-
ples of state-level restrictions on governmental purchase of foreign goods or policy, see Na-
tional Association of State Purchasing Officials, Survey on Domestic v. Foreign Purchases
(1963) (unpublished compilation).
"Usher, California's Buy-American Policy: Conflict with GATT and the Constitution,
17 STA l. L. Rzv. 199 (1964).
" Id. See generally Hobin, GATT, the California Buy-American Act, and the Continu-
ing Struggle Between Free Trade and Protectionism, 52 CALw. L. Rav. 335 (1964).
61 Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Super. Ct., 208 Cal. App.2d 803, 25 Cal. Rptr. 798,
819-20 (1962).
" 76 CONG. REc. 3254 (1933) (remarks of Sen. Vandenburg).
" Buy-American Act, 41 U.S.C. §§10(a)-(d).
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local sourcing legislation can avoid contravening the letter and the
spirit of article 111(4) of the GATT. Unlike some of the state "buy-
American" laws, the federal law provides at least two escape routes
from the preference for American goods or services: (1) the cost
differential must not be "unreasonable" and (2) the preference
must not be "inconsistent with the public interest."6 ' Undertak-
ings given to FIRA in relation to local sourcing could be couched in
such terms as to be non-discriminatory in relation to imports. This
is already being done in some instances. Apple Computer, Inc.'s
undertaking to FIRA to "actively seek to develop Canadian sources
for power supply units and semi-conducter memories" was condi-
tional. "In the event that power supply units or any other compo-
nents can be sourced in Canada at competitive prices, quality, re-
liability, and in quantities sufficiently large to meet the needs of
the applicant and of the new business, the applicant will purchase
such products and components..." 65 (emphasis added).
Article III presents a host of difficult interpretative problems
and involves major policy issues. A nation may be entitled in some
circumstances to impose conditions on foreign investors which ef-
fectively curtail imports and afford a "protection" that may be
worse than a tariff. It may be relevant that the imposed conditions
were not directed toward "protectionism." A nation may have a
wide variety of programs and legislation, such as Canada's FIRA or
National Energy Program, designed to protect the well-being of its
people and its economy. Few would advocate an international eco-
nomic system of rules which would prevent nations from exercising
their sovereignty to provide for domestic policy goals in various
ways.
B. GATT Article XI: Quantitative Restrictions
Value-added requirements and local sourcing requirements also
may be considered violative of article XI(1), which prohibits quan-
titative restrictions." As stated in paragraph 1 of that article:
No prohibition or restrictions other than duties, taxes or
other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import
or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or
maintained by any Contracting Party on the importation of
any product of the territory of any other Contracting Party
Usher, supra note 59, at 224-25.
e FIRA, Release No. F-180 (Sept. 24, 1981) at 3.




While local sourcing requirements cause firms to purchase goods
locally which they would perhaps prefer to import, value-added re-
quirements curtail imports of components which a manufacturer
may have preferred to import but is forced to produce locally. The
result is a quantitative regulation which is set by a complicated
formula.6 7 Thus, although a quota is not directly imposed, the re-
sult that would have been achieved by a quota is brought about by
the value-added or local sourcing requirement. Foreign investors
could argue that the value-added undertakings which they give to
FIRA may be considered "measures" maintained by Canada to re-
strict the importation of the products involved in the
undertakings.
Quantitative restrictions such as quotas have always been
frowned upon by the United States on the ground that they make
all international commerce a matter of political negotiation: "goods
move, not on the basis of quality, service and trade, but on the
basis of deals. . . ... Value-added requirements imposed on for-
eign investors make import levels subject to deals between firms
and host countries rather than to the forces of the open market.
The local market is sealed off from competition. Furthermore, un-
like tariffs, which can be surmounted in some circumstances, quo-
tas cannot be overcome either through increased efficiency by the
exporter or through decreased efficiency by the importer; imports
are still limited.
The prohibitive quantitative restriction provisions of GATT
have three major exceptions. Quantitative restrictions may be
maintained for balance-of-payments purposes, to support certain
domestic agricultural programs, and by the less-developed coun-
tries to further their economic programs in certain circumstances. 9
Most of the major trading nations, including the United States,
have some quantitative restrictions concerning agricultural and
food products.70 Because of the history of exceptions that have al-
ways riddled article XI(1), Canada could present strong economic
reasons, either within the balance-of-payments category or gener-
,' LICIT, supra note 21, at 21. For examples of various types of value-added require-
ments, see id. at 4-8.
" Statement by American delegate to the United Nations, U.N. Doc. EPCT/A/PV 22, at
16-17 (1947).
" K. DAm, supra note 18, at 20-21.
70 Id. at 165.
1983]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
ally as a necessary economic protection, to justify the need for
value-added requirements in foreign investment within Canada. At
the 1946-47 GATT preparatory conferences, India, one of the na-
tions not yet industrialized, commented concerning restrictions:
Our approach to this program is very different, and. .. on
many points the disagreement between our experts and the
American experts is fundamental.... The kind of co-opera-
tion to which India attaches importance is a relationship
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples.
From every point of view, we consider that it is essential
that the nation's economic development should not be left
wholly to the operations of private enterprise and unchecked
competition, whether internal or external, as seems to be im-
plied by some of these proposals"
Canada has expressed similar sentiments on various occasions.7
Although the United States itself has enjoyed a waiver from arti-
cle XI obligations and other governments have widely ignored the
criteria of article XI for years, the United States was not prevented
from claiming in 1976 that certain agricultural restrictions imposed
by Canada were not justified by article XI.73 There is no reason to
believe that continued enjoyment of the article XI waiver will pre-
vent the United States from raising article XI objections in the
FIRA/GATT conflict. However, Canada can argue that the history
of article XI shows that the article is not always strictly complied
with, that there is an economic need for the development of indus-
try, that undertakings given by private enterprises do not consti-
tute measures instituted by the Canadian government, and that
the United States does not come before the GATT with "clean
hands" in matters of quantitative restrictions.
C. GATT Article XVI: Subsidies
Article XVI(1) of the GATT seeks to restrain contracting parties
from granting or maintaining "any form of income or price sup-
port, which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of
any product from, or to reduce imports" of any product into, their
71 U.N. Doc. EPCT/PV3, at 19-24 (1947).
71 See The Gray Report, supra note 6. See also Response of Herb Gray, Canadian Minis-
ter of Industry, Trade and Commerce to the Brief on the Foreign Investment Review Act
prepared by the Canadian Bar Association, FIRA, Release No. F-18 (Mar. 2, 1982).
" See supra note 3.
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territories.7" Subsidies were regarded by the GATT drafters as un-
desirable interferences with the free flow of trade.75 Both value-
added requirements, which may be said to reduce imports, and ex-
port performance requirements, which may be said to increase ex-
ports, could be regarded as subsidies. The language of article
XVI(1) indicates, however, that the drafters of that article clearly
envisaged the classical form of subsidy, i.e. payment of money to
someone to do something or refrain from doing something. Govern-
ment actions such as currency retention practices," value-added
requirements, or export performance requirements may have the
effect of subsidies, but they are not at this point clearly prohibited
by the GATT. If the FIRA undertakings which in effect constitute
non-monetary subsidies were challenged under article XVI(1) of
the GATT, Canada would probably strongly oppose such an at-
tempt to read into the provision prohibition of actions not contem-
plated at the time of drafting. Any other approach would result in
the elimination of a number of positive practices and programs
designed by governments to deal with specific problems not di-
rectly related to trade.
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE FIRA
Canada appears determined that FIRA will continue to exist in
its present form.77 The United States appears equally adamant
, GATT, supra note 2, art. XVI, para. (1):
If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, including any form
of income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase
exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any product into, its
territory, it shall notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES in writing of the ex-
tent and nature of the subsidization, of the estimated effect of the subsidiza-
tion on the quantity of the affected product or products imported into or ex-
ported from its territory and of the circumstances making the subsidization
necessary. In any case in which it is determined that serious prejudice to the
interests of any other contracting party is caused or threatened by such subsi-
dization, the contracting party granting the subsidy shall, upon request, dis-
cuss with the other contracting party or parties concerned, or with the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES, the possibility of limiting the subsidization.
, See generally, K. DAM, supra note 18, at 132.
76 Currency retention consists of permitting exporters to retain a portion of scarce for-
eign exchange proceeds. Depending upon the details of the system, these proceeds
may be sold in a free market, where, under scarcity conditions, they will command a
price higher than that obtainable under the official exchange rate, or they may be
used to import foreign goods for which foreign exchange would otherwise be unavail-
able under the applicable exchange control regulations.
Id. at 137.
" Canada's Minister of Industry and Trade, Ed Lumley, informed reporters in February
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about its opposition to FIRA practices and its determination to
challenge the legality of these practices. The United States is, in
fact, committed to an intensive use of the GATT dispute settle-
ment procedures by virtue of provisions in the Trade Act of 1979
requiring the administration to pursue these procedures in re-
sponse to meritorious complaints by private citizens.
Any discussion of the possible outcome of the FIRA-Canada/
GATT-United States deadlock must take place in the light of the
history of dispute resolution within the GATT, the limitations on
possible legal action within the GATT, as well as the economic re-
alities of the day which are an inevitable component of any trade
dispute. Even though the original GATT is a fairly legalistic docu-
ment, pragmatism has always played a major role in its interpreta-
tion and administration by the GATT Secretariat and by some of
its most influential contracting parties.
Neither the dispute resolution provisions of the GATT nor the
history of their use provides any encouragement to contracting
parties to bring their differences before the other GATT con-
tracting parties in the form of a legal dispute.80 Article XXIII doc-
uments clearly emphasize a preference for voluntary settlement of
disputes between contracting parties.81 Article XXIII itself does
not give a contracting party a "right" to the establishment of a
panel upon request. Legislative history indicates that it was in-
tended that the GATT contracting parties treat the panel proce-
dure as a last resort to be used with great caution.8 A preference
for consultation and conciliation was indicated then and has pre-
vailed since. Even where a dispute reaches the panel procedure
stage, as has the FIRA/GATT dispute, attempts to achieve concili-
1983 that he doubts that legislative changes for FIRA are a current government priority.
The Windsor Star, Feb. 22, 1983, at 1, col. 3.
78 Section 901 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2411-2416 (West
1980), amends and expands Ch. 1 of Title III of the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618,
§301, 88 Stat. 2041 (1975).
79 See generally Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement after the Tokyo Round: An Unfin-
ished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145 (1980).
80 Id.
8 The dispute settlement procedures of the GATT are encompassed in two documents.
See Draft Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance, GATT Doc. MTN/FR/W/20/Rev 2, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 634 (1979) [hereinafter cited as H.R. Doc. No. 153]; Agreed Description of
the Customary Practice of the GATT in the Field of Dispute Settlement (art. XXIII:2),
reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153, supra, at 641.
82 Hudec, supra note 79, at 159.
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ation between the disputants continue.8"
Economic protectionism is widely prevalent today. The protec-
tionist activities have become so serious in sectors such as steel,
automobiles, chemicals, textiles, footwear, and farm products that
trade ministers and officials at the GATT have drawn parallels
with the Depression of the 1930's.8' Given the existing economic
realities and the fact that the trade-related performance require-
ments which the United States alleges as contrary to Canada's
GATT obligations are not uncommon among the practices of other
GATT contracting parties, the panel investigating the FIRA/
GATT dispute has a difficult task ahead. It cannot be unaware
that the effectiveness of the GATT's legal rules has always rested
upon the consensus among contracting parties, a consensus not
necessarily articulated, of what constitutes acceptable government
action.
It is not the first time that a GATT panel has been faced with a
complex case which presents issues that exceed those of common
trade disputes. A 1961 complaint by Uruguay listed over 600 major
restrictions imposed by fifteen developed countries and asked the
panel, without further participation by Uruguay, to rule on the le-
gality and/or "nullification and impairment" consequences of the
various restrictions."s In spite of doubts by many GATT observers
as to the appropriateness of the panel for such a "high profile"
case, the panel in question presented a respectable outcome.8 6 The
FIRA/GATT panel will be touching upon the highly sensitive issue
of a nation's sovereign right to regulate domestic matters such as
foreign investment and economic development.
The possibilities for the investigating panel are legion. It is pos-
sible, although highly unlikely, that the panel will refuse to make a
finding because of the sensitive and complex nature of the dispute.
Such a refusal would not be in the best interests of GATT as an
international institution. The panel may delay making a formal
legal finding by asking for more information or by urging the par-
ties to continue to seek a negotiated settlement.87 As trade-related
H.R. Doc. No. 153, supra note 81, at 639.
" The Globe and Mail, Nov. 20, 1982, at B1.
GATT Doc. L/1647, appendix, case 55 (1961).
Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, GATT, BISD 95 (11th Supp. 1963); GATT,
BISD 35 (13th Supp. 1965); GATT Doc. L/1647, appendix, case 55 (1961) at U5.
" This technique was employed by the panel which investigated a 1972 charge by the
United States in which the United Kingdom was violating GATT articles XI and XIII by
maintaining quantitative restrictions that discriminated against United States exports in
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performance requirements are not directly prohibited by the
GATT, the panel probably will not make a finding of guilt or non-
guilt regarding violation of the GATT. However, as article XXIII
can be invoked even in the absence of any breach of GATT obliga-
tions, there is still the possibility of a finding of nullification or
impairment of any benefit accruing to the United States under the
GATT by the actions of Canada or by "the existence of any other
situation." s
The terms "nullification or impairment" have not been precisely
defined. It is unclear whether the concept of "nullification or im-
pairment" can be interpreted as being related to the balance of
benefits derived from the GATT. Since the balance of benefits re-
ceived under the GATT can be described in very broad and gen-
eral terms, such an interpretation is fraught with danger. New obli-
gations could be read into the GATT. If the panel were to regard
some of the undertakings given by foreign investors to FIRA as
trade-related performance requirements imposed upon foreign in-
vestors by the Canadian Government, these requirements (even
though not directly prohibited by the GATT) could be regarded as
nullifying or impairing benefits accruing to the United States
under the GATT. This possibility is strengthened if the concept of
nullification or impairment is related to the expectations of the
complaining contracting party - in this case, the United States.8'
Such an approach would greatly diminish any Canadian arguments
regarding Canadian motives in accepting trade-related perform-
ance undertakings given by foreign investors.
There is evidence to indicate that the concept of "nullification or
impairment" does not in fact render the use of article XXIII un-
limited. There is a statement contained in the GATT preparatory
work that article XXIII should not be used to "change the obliga-
tions" of the agreement." In other words, new obligations should
not be read into the GATT via article XXIII. Furthermore, at least
one attempt to broadly interpret "nullification or impairment" has
favour of exports from certain Caribbean developing countries. The reaction of developing
countries to the United States complaint led the panel to note the legal issues and to re-
quest the parties to continue searching for a negotiated settlement that would protect the
interests of the developing countries involved. United Kingdom- Dollar Area Quotas, GATT,
BISD 236 (20th Supp. 1974).
" GATT, supra note 2, art. XXIII, para. 1.
" Chile's expectations played a significant role in a 1949 dispute with Australia. GATT,
II BISD 188 (1952).
-U.N. Doc. E/Conf.2/C.6/W.43, 49 (1948).
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failed. In 1960, the majority of a group of experts studying the
question of whether or not article XXIII should be legally invo-
cable in situations where restrictive business practices cause "nulli-
fication or impairment" felt that it was dangerous to use article
XXIII in these circumstances. 91 Trade-related performance re-
quirements in relation to "nullification or impairment" may meet a
similar fate at the hands of the FIRA/GATT panel.
GATT panel reports to the contracting parties usually are ac-
cepted without major amendments. Upon receiving the report of
the FIRA/GATT panel, should the contracting parties decide that
"nullification or impairment" has occurred, they may authorize the
United States to suspend the application to Canada of such con-
cessions or other obligations under the GATT that the United
States determines to be appropriate in the circumstances. 2 Thus
far in the history of the GATT, only one dispute has resulted in
suspension of concessions."3 Even if there is a finding of "nullifica-
tion or impairment" in the FIRA/GATT dispute, it is highly ques-
tionable whether the suspension of United States concessions to
Canada would do anything to resolve the actual issues involved in
the dispute. Suspension of concessions would probably be a back-
ward step which could lead to a spiralling of retaliatory actions by
both sides.
There are some positive possibilities open to the panel. Rather
than finding that the benefits of the GATT enjoyed by the United
States are being nullified or impaired by FIRA and thereby risk
alienating not only Canada but all of the other countries that regu-
late foreign investment, the panel could attempt to give recogni-
tion to the substance of the dispute, while at the same time sug-
gesting a way out for both disputants that enables them to exercise
their sovereign rights. The panel could note that Canada is well
within its rights in regulating foreign investment, that the FIRA
does not require or impose trade-related performance require-
ments, and furthermore that trade-related performance require-
ments are not directly in contravention of the GATT obligations
undertaken by Canada. It could also note that, although Canada's
FIRA does not directly contravene Canada's GATT obligations, a
situation does exist in which the United States believes that its
GATT, BISD 172 (9th Supp. 1961).
GATT, supra note 2, art. XXIII(2).
"See Netherlands complaint against United States, GATT, BISD 32 (1st
Supp. 1953).
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level of trade is being affected by the undertakings given to FIRA
by United States investors and that the United States is within its
rights in attempting to ensure that the flow of trade in and out of
the United States is not interfered with by the actions of another
GATT contracting party. In order to enable Canada to carry out
its objective of permitting only foreign investment that is of bene-
fit to it, FIRA should not be denied the right to accept trade-re-
lated undertakings such as value-added or local sourcing undertak-
ings. United States interests, on the other hand, could be protected
if these undertakings were couched in competitive terms so that
the foreign investors undertake to give Canadian products and
materials a first option that is required to be competitive with
what the investors could obtain abroad. This compromise may not
take care of Canada's need to protect, so as to strengthen, certain
sectors of the Canadian economy. FIRA practice indicates that cer-
tain sectors of the Canadian economy are regarded as "sensitive,"
but the identity of these sectors has not always been clear to po-
tential foreign investors.94 It may be possible for Canada to negoti-
ate with the United States, in the GATT tradition, a list of limited
"sensitive" sectors in which it will be free to accept trade-related
performance undertakings in whatever terms the foreign investors
choose to give the undertakings. Such a Canadian request would
not be unreasonable considering that the United States already
protects a number of sectors of its own economy.95 The panel's rec-
ommendation to the contracting parties of the FIRA/GATT dis-
pute could be that undertakings made to FIRA be couched in com-
petitive terms in relation to all but those sectors of the Canadian
economy as agreed upon by the United States and Canada.
V. CONCLUSION
Both parties to an international trade dispute typically seek to
further the best interests of their own citizens. In the FIRA/GATT
dispute, Canada wants to develop its own economy and promote
the interests of its own producers and manufacturers; the United
States wants to ensure that Canada's actions do not interfere with
its own citizens' trading activities. Fortunately, the GATT is an
international institution that provides the flexibility which allows
The unpredictable application of §2(2) of FIRA to various sectors was one concern ex-
pressed in the Canadian Bar Association Brief to Herb Gray, Minister of Industry, Trade
and Commerce (Sept. 24, 1981).
9 See generally Note, supra note 36.
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the disputing contracting parties to achieve their respective goals if
a pragmatic and realistic approach is adopted in relation to the
GATT provisions.

